Break the Chains, Not the Nation: Why Nigerian Politicians Must Choose Citizens Over Godfathers

By Kareem Iyanda PhD

In political science, godfatherism refers to an extra-constitutional arrangement in which an unaccountable power broker (the godfather) utilizes private resources—such as money, militias, media influence, or patronage networks—to install, protect, and control elected officials (the godson). Nigerian politics, characterized by high-stakes access to state resources and weak institutionalization, has become a prime theatre for this phenomenon.

Politically, godfatherism distorts three foundational pillars of democracy:

First, Popular Sovereignty: Votes no longer determine electoral outcomes; the godfather’s “endorsement” does. Party primaries become mere ratification rituals, reducing party members to spectators rather than principals.

Second, Separation of Powers: When a godfather exerts control over the executive, legislature, and judiciary through proxies, checks and balances collapse. The state effectively becomes a franchise of private interests.

Third, Political Accountability: Elected officials owe allegiance not to the constitution or the electorate, but to their godfather. Consequently, policy decisions, public contracts, and political appointments are driven by the godfather’s accumulation logic rather than the public good.

The result is a neopatrimonial trap: instead of strengthening institutions, politicians reinforce systems of personal dependence. With each election cycle, godfathers demand higher returns, often leading to political violence, defections, and the impeachment of “rebellious” godsons. Nigeria has witnessed this repeatedly—from Lagos in the early 2000s to more recent developments in Kogi, Rivers, and Edo States.

The Central Question: Which Way Forward? Two distinct paths lie ahead:

Path A (Entrenchment): The continued dominance of godfatherism will entrench a pseudo-democratic system where politics operates as a franchise business. Economic diversification will stagnate, as godfathers prioritize rent-seeking—through oil allocations, contracts, and security votes—over productive investment. Youth disengagement may deepen, with rising insecurity and insurgency as consequences.

Path B (Exit): Institutional reforms offer a viable escape. Strengthening the autonomy of electoral commissions, ensuring transparency in party financing, implementing direct primary systems that eliminate delegate manipulation, and safeguarding judicial independence can collectively raise the cost of godfatherism. Citizens, in turn, must organize around issues rather than personalities.

Conclusion: A Warning to Politicians
To every politician who has staked their entire career on godfatherism—who has traded conscience for a godfather’s patronage, mandate for personal loyalty, and future for political dependency—this is a clear warning:

A godfather does not raise successors; he raises debtors.
The moment you cease to be an asset—when your political value declines or a more desperate protégé emerges—the same hand that elevated you can dismantle you. You may be impeached, disgraced, or discarded without recourse. A life invested in such a system yields only two outcomes: public disrepute and personal ruin.

No godfather is eternal, but the people’s memory of compromised leadership endures. The path forward for Nigerian politics lies not in deepening allegiance to power brokers, but in strengthening accountability to the electorate. Abandon godfatherism now—or risk being abandoned by history.

Finally, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu did not emerge as President through godfatherism. Therefore, he should uphold democratic principles by allowing party members to freely elect their representatives, rather than assuming the role of a godfather to aspiring candidates.